After Britain's withdrawal from the Persian Gulf in 1971, Iran, as a peacemaker in region, reached an understanding with the Sheikhs of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah regarding the return of the islands of Tunb and Abu Musa to Iran. In 1992, two decades later, the issue of the islands' ownership became a point of contention again. However, based on the archive of secret British documents, long before the UAE took any action, in the early days of the Ba’athist regime’s-imposed war against Iran, Oman collaborated with Iraq to seize the islands and adopted contradictory policies in this regard. Understanding the origin and causes of Oman's approaches, given its geopolitical position in the region, is essential. This research, using a descriptive-analytical method and drawing on library and documentary sources, examines Oman's diplomacy concerning this issue. The main research question is: What positions did Oman adopt regarding the UAE's claim after the Islamic Revolution, and why? It is hypothesized that Oman, relying on superior power, adopted two approaches: first, in the early days of the Iran-Iraq War, it supported Iraq in seizing the islands, and then it emphasized resolving the dispute through diplomatic means. The reasons for these positions were the fall of the monarchy, the sudden change in regional conditions, and an attempt to restore the previous order; and then the acceptance of the status quo and an emphasis on maintaining it through strategic negotiations to preserve regional stability.