Abstract:
After the victory of the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the Islamic Revolution of Iran was simultaneously involved in multiple crises. The “terror crisis” was one of the dangerous and important crises that the “Forghan Group” inflicted on the Islamic Republic of Iran in the first months of the victory of the revolution. Like all crises, this crisis went through a “crisis cycle” including emergence, peak, expansion, and decline, so it has all the conditions that a full-fledged crisis has. The question of the article is: given the relatively anarchic atmosphere of 1979, how was the Forghan Group crisis, as the “first terror crisis,” managed? This article, relying on “crisis management theories,” uses an analytical-descriptive method, library tools, and a review of existing documents to examine the Forghan Group terror crisis and how this crisis was managed. The hypothesis of this article is formulated as follows: considering the chaotic atmosphere prevailing in the first year of the revolution and in the absence of intelligence and security organizations, as well as considering the time and place requirements, the solution adopted at different stages of confronting the Furqan group - among the different methods and patterns - was the "contingency method". Therefore, after reviewing the existing documents and documents and analyzing the crisis process, the article confirms the hypothesis; and shows that the officials at the time of the revolution were affected by the field requirements and were able to stop the terror crisis at that stage.